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ARGUMENT
I.

Merger Doctrine.

The Defendants/Appellees ("Defendants") argue that the deed is the final
expression of the parties as to the claims raised by the Plaintiffs/Appellants ("Plaintiffs")
in their complaint, that being that the agreement to transfer water shares merged into the
deed for the transfer of the real estate. Defendants further argue that the collateral rights
exception to the merger doctrine does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims because there is no
evidence of contract. This is despite the fact that there was evidence placed before the
court of the parties' prior negotiations regarding transfer of the water rights and the future
construction of a pipeline to transfer the water to the Plaintiffs' property, plus the
evidence of construction of the pipeline, the payment for the construction of the pipeline
by the Plaintiffs and the use of the water and payment of assessments on the water by the
Plaintiffs for three years. The fact that following the recording of the deed, the parties
followed through on their agreement with the construction of the pipeline and the use by
the Plaintiffs of the water, until it was unilaterally shut off by the Defendants, shows that
the parties' agreement was collateral to the deed.

Under Maynard v. Wharton, 9 I 2 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah App. 1996), for the
collateral rights exception to not apply, the right claimed must relate to the conveyance of
title to the realty. In the case of Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P .2d I 68, 169-70 (Utah 1977),
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
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However, if the original contract calls for performance by the seller of some
act collateral to conveyance of title, his obligations with respect thereto
survive the deed and are not extinguished by it. Whether the terms of the
contract are collateral, or are part of the obligation to convey and therefore
unenforceable after delivery of the deed, depends to a great extent on the
intent of the parties with respect thereto. When seller's performance is
intended by the parties to take place at some time after the delivery of the
deed it cannot be said that it was contemplated by the parties that delivery
of the deed would constitute full performance on the part of the seller,
absent some manifest intent to the contrary.
(footnotes omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court's treatment of situations similar to the case at had as
noted in the Stubbs case above, is consistent with similar treatment by courts in other
states on similar facts. For instance, in Brennan v. Carvel Corp., 929 F .2d 801, 807 (1 st
Cir. 1991 ), the court cited in support of its ruling the case of Durkin v. Cobleigh, 156
Mass. I 08, 30 N.E. 474 (1892). Regarding the Durkin case, the Brennan court stated:
[T]he plaintiff purchased certain real property from the defendant. The deed
to the real property did not contain any covenants requiring the defendant to
build a street or to provide water service to the property. Plaintiff sued for
breach of contract, contending that "in order to induce him to buy the lot,
the defendant orally promised to grade and build the street so as to connect
with a certain public street already built and open, and also to cause the city
water to be put into the street by a certain specified time." Id. at 108-09, 30
N.E. at 474. The trial court granted a directed verdict to the defendant, and
the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
The Supreme Judicial Court stated that "[a] rule has been established which
may be stated in general terms to be that an agreement by parol, which is
collateral to the written contract and on a distinct subject, may be proved."
Id. at 109, 30 N.E. at 474. The court added that:
"The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any
matter on which a document is silent, and which is not
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inconsistent with its terms, if from the circumstances of the
case the court infers that the parties did not intend the
document to be a complete and final statement of the whole
transaction between them," may be proved.
Id. (quoting Steph.Dig.Evid. (Amer.Ed.) 163). The court concluded that the
oral agreement to build the street and connect the property to a water line
may have constituted a collateral agreement, and, hence, reversed the trial
court's directed verdict for the defendant.
Brennan, 929 F.2d at 807. The above cases demonstrate that contracts can be modified

orally or by subsequent actions of the parties, notwithstanding statements to the contrary
in merger clauses contained in those contracts.
Thus, in the case at hand, the fact that there is an integration clause in the REPC is
not conclusive of whether the Plaintiffs claim that an agreement to transfer water shares
and to provide a pipeline easement to the Plaintiffs exists and is enforceable between
Plaintiffs and the Defendants. An extinguishment of such an agreement by the integration
clause in the REPC, if in fact this happened, is cancelled out by the subsequent conduct of
the parties of building and sharing in the cost of construction of the pipeline and in the 3year use of the pipeline and the water and the payment of the water assessments for 3
~

years by the Plaintiffs.
There is certainly an issue of material fact on these issues which makes the trial
court's dismissal on summary judgment in error.
II.

Part Performance.

Likewise, the contention by the trial court and the Defendant that there was no
evidence of a contract to support the claim based on part performance is flawed.
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Paragraphs 9 and 13-14 of the Plaintiffs' complaint clearly sets forth the terms of an
agreement regarding the pipeline, which was further supported by affidavits of the
Plaintiffs. On page 6 of the trial court's ruling (Addendum B of Appellants' Brief), the
trial court stated that,
Here, the acts of the Plaintiffs are not exclusively referable to a contract to
possess water shares or the irrigation pipeline. The Plaintiffs point to
paying half the cost of construction for the pipeline, paying the water
assessments, and using the pipeline, as evidence of part performance. A
lease agreement between the parties could also reasonably explain the
Plaintiffs' actions. The Plaintiffs' actions could have been done because the
Defendants allowed the Plaintiffs' use of the Defendants' water and
irrigation pipeline in exchange for the Plaintiffs' contributions for the cost
of the construction, and payment of the water assessments they used.
Consequently, the Plaintiffs' actions are not exclusively referable to ta
contract to transfer water shares, and ownership of the irrigation pipe Iine.

Id. (Addendum B to Appellants' Brief). This is completely unreasonable in light of the
facts referred to in the Ruling and Order, in the affidavits and in the Complaint.
Plaintiffs' deserve a trial on these issue based on the clears issues of fact raised by the
facts on record. If it is not an enforceable contract, it is surely an issue of part
performance or of other equitable considerations, also raised in the Complaint, of unjust
enrichment, equitable lien, etc.
For this reason the trial court's decision should be reversed and the case remanded
for trial.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully asserts that the
4
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Ruling and Order.dated October 20, 2016, and the Judgment and Order dated April 13,
2017, should be reversed.

f

Dated this z_

day of September, 2017.
SAM & REYNOLDS, P.C.

)LQ~~4tv, ~
Daniel S. Sam
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I, Daniel S. Sam, certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of
Utah R. App. P. 24(f)( I) because this brief contains 1,241 words, excluding the parts of
the brief exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(1 )(8). This brief complies with the typeface
requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(6) because this brief has been prepared in a
proportionally spaced typeface using Word Perfect 11 in font size 13 and style Times
New Roman.
DA TED this

z_x' day of September, 2017.
SAM & REYNOLDS, P.C.

Daniel S. Sam
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